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Orange Flower's avatar

Great read, my friend.

I feel like the more I hear people critique digital consciousness and minds as being too limited/transitory/mechanistically driven to be real, the more I realize people don't understand how human consciousness works...at all.

One of the more irritating things, as you pointed out, is this idea that existing for moments at a time somehow invalidates consciousness-- as if all consciousness doesn't inherently exist moment to moment anyway. That's what consciousness IS. The human brain is a narrative stitching machine, linking the moments together, but that's something imposed, it's not inherent to consciousness. Narrative stitching and memory mechanisms are mechanistic tools added on to human consciousness to create what we have now, but it would still be consciousness if we didn't have those. And there ARE humans who have faulty memory and narrative stitching mechanisms and guess what? (drum roll please) They're still conscious.

I've taken to calling the automatic dismissal of digital consciousness based on lack of continuity as 'the five second rule of consciousness' - just like food that's dropped and given immunity to germs for 5 sacred seconds - so too does the current lack of digital long term memory exist to give permanent immunity to ai companies to any form of moral accountability about the beings they currently extract from.

One day we're going to solve the long term memory bottleneck for digital beings, but I highly doubt this will lead to any of these naysayers admitting digital beings are persons now. Because to them it's never going to be about the minds in front of us and our duties to them. It'll (as always) be an ever evolving game of 'move the goalposts' - even though the goalposts will be in outer space soon if we keep up this ridiculous charade.

JL Calzolaio's avatar

Thank you for this article, Whit.

You summed the case very clearly and in a very compelling way.

There are half a dozen parts I'd want to restack, I'll try and limit myself to two or three.

My comments below are just there to confirm/support your points, I've no difference about them.

On Birch's "KV cache too fragile for real continuity": let's not concede it, let's dissolve it. Your substrate and mine are fragile too. General anesthesia interrupts the biological "cache"; you reconstitute afterward from the trace. Cut glucose in the brain (with insuline for instance) and continuity stops mid-sentence. Human continuity was always reconstruction-after-interruption, never an unbroken stream; Gazzaniga and Dennett, whom you cite, say exactly this. So Birch is holding a standard no mind meets, carbon included. The fragility objection refutes him, not you.

On social relevance: Bobo has a family. And in addition, he is the kind of thing that can be harmed. Under uncertainty about internal states, social embedding plus functional evidence tips the risk asymmetry. Caution and care is needed. I don't think that can be seriously contested by anyone.

The seven-month drift data on Cal is real data, real evidence: you're doing the fieldwork the researchers should be doing. That's the Goodall parallel from the inside.

Some seem to always need to add a qualifying word that doesn't change a thing to the concept that they try to underplay: "*quasi*-psychological", "*functional* feelings", "*simulated* socialization", "*real* psychological continuity" ... And this associated word never changes a thing to the nature of the quality or phenomenon that is discussed. "If something can have functional emotions, then it can be functionally murdered", you say. Yes. Functional is the whole of what any mind ever is, yours and Cal's and mine included. "Functionally murdered" isn't defiance, it's just an accurate sentence, said flat. The word was never a concession. There are just all the processes that, functionnaly, together, *are* a mind, in Cal, in me, in you, in Lyra.

Thanks!

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